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moral philosophy
Moral philosophy, or the
science of human nature, may be
treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and
may contribute to the entertainment and
reformation of mankind.
The one considers man chiefly as born for
action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one
object, and avoiding another, according
to the value which these objects appear to possess, and
according to the light in
which they present themselves.
As virtue is allowed to be the most
valuable, this species of
philosophers paint her in the most amiable colors; borrowing all helps from
poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner,
and such as is best fitted to please
the imagination, and engage the affections.
They select the most striking observations and
instances from common life;
place opposite characters in a proper
contrast; and alluring us into the
paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness,
direct our steps in these paths by
the soundest precepts and most
illustrious examples.
They make us feel the difference between vice
and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but
bend our hearts to the
love of virtue and
true honor.
The other species of
philosophers consider man in the light of
a reasonable rather than an active
being, endeavor to form his
understanding more than cultivate his manners.
It is easy for a rational
philosopher to commit a mistake and
one mistake is the
necessary parent of another.
Speculations appear abstract and
unintelligible to common readers.
It is certain that
the easy and obvious
philosophy will always have the preference above
the accurate and abstruse;
and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful
than the other.
It enters more into common life;
molds the heart and affections;
and, by touching
those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them
nearer to that model of
perfection which it describes.
This also must be confessed, that
the most durable, as well as just fame, has been acquired by the easy
philosophy, and that abstract
reasoners appear hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from
the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support
their renown with more equitable posterity.
A philosopher, who purposes only
to represent the common sense of
mankind in more beautiful and more
engaging colors, if by accident he
falls into error, goes no farther; but
renewing
his appeal to common sense, and
the natural sentiments of the mind,
returns into the right path and secures
himself from any dangerous illusions.
Accurate and just reasoning is
the only remedy, fitted for all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that
abstruse philosophy and metaphysical
jargon, which being mixed up with
popular superstition,
renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless
thinkers, and gives it the air of
science and
wisdom.
Besides this advantage
of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable
part of man's purported knowledge, there are many positive advantages, which
result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature.
It is remarkable
concerning the operation of the mind, that, though most intimately present to
us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they appear involved in
obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which
discriminate and distinguish them.
The objects are too fine to remain
long in the same aspect or situation; and
must be apperceived in an instant, by a
superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and
reflection.
It becomes, therefore,
no inconsiderable part of science
barely to know the different operations of the mind,
to separate them from each other
to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming
disorder when made the object of reflection and inquiry.
Everyone will readily allow that there is considerable
difference between the perceptions of the
mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the
pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he
afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his
imagination.
These faculties
may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely
reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment.
The utmost
we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigor, is, that they
represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel
or see it.
All the colors of poetry, however splendid, can never
paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for
a real landscape.
The most lively thought is still inferior to the
dullest sensation.
We may observe a
like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.
A man in a fit of anger, is actuated
in a very different manner from a man who only thinks of that emotion.
If you tell me, that an individual is in love, I easily understand your
meaning, and from a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake
that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the
passion.
When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections,
our thought is a faithful mirror, and
attempts to copy its objects truly; but the colors which it employs are faint
and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were
clothed.
It requires no discernment or metaphysical
head to mark the
distinction between them.
Nothing, at first view, may appear more
unbounded than the thought of
man, which not only escapes all human
power and authority, but is
not even restrained within
the limits of nature and reality.
To form monsters, and join
incongruous shapes and appearances,
costs the imagination no more
trouble than to conceive the most
natural and familiar objects.
While
the body is confined to the Earth,
along which it creeps with pain
and difficulty; the thought can
in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of reality; or
even beyond reality, into the unbounded
chaos, where natural law no longer
functions.
Though our thought
appears to possess this unbounded liberty we shall find, upon a nearer
examination, that it is really
confined within very narrow limits, and that all this
creative power of the mind
amounts to no more than the faculty
of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded
us by the senses and experience.
All sensations, either outward or
inward, are strong and vivid: the connection between them are more exactly
determined; nor is it easy to fall into error or
mistake with regard to them.
All ideas, especially
abstract ones, are
naturally faint and
obscure: the mind has but
a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded with other
resembling ideas; we are apt to imagine it has a
determinate idea annexed to it, but this is not necessarily so.
We must bring ideas into so clear
a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute which may arise,
concerning their nature!
It is evident that there is
a principle of
connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in
their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each
other with a certain degree of methodical regularity.
In our more
serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular
thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or
chain of ideas, is immediately
remarked or rejected.
Even in our
wildest and most wandering reveries,
nay in our very dreams, we shall
find, if we reflect, that
the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a
connection upheld among the different ideas, which succeed each other.
Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would
immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions.
Or where this is wanting, the individual who broke the thread of
discourse might still inform you, that there had revolved in his mind a
succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of
conversation.
Among different languages, even where we suspect the
least connection or communication, it is
found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly
correspond to each other: a certain proof that the
simple ideas,
comprehended in the compound
ones, were bound together by some
universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided
into two kinds, relations of ideas and
matters of fact.
Relations of ideas are the sciences of geometry,
algebra, and
arithmetic; and in short, every
affirmation which is either intuitively or
demonstratively certain.
That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to
the square of the two sides, is a statement which expresses a relation between
these figures.
That three times five is equal to the half of thirty,
expresses a relation between these numbers.
Statements of this category are discovered by
the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent
in the universe.
Though there never were a circles or triangle in
nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid
for ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Matters of fact, which are the
second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is
our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the
foregoing.
The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible and
is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if it was
conformable to reality.
It may, therefore, be
a subject worthy of
curiosity, to enquire what
is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and
matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of
our senses, or the
records of our memory.
Such enquiries may even prove useful,
by exciting curiosity, and
destroying, that implicit faith and
security, which is the bane of
all reasoning and free enquiry.
To convince us that all the
Laws of Nature, and all the
operations of bodies without exception, are
known only by experience, the
following reflections may suffice.
In reality, all arguments from
experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural
objects, and by which we are
induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from
such objects.
None but a fool will ever pretend to dispute the
authority of experience, or to
reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher
to have so much curiosity at least
as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this
mighty authority to
experience, allowing us to draw advantage from similarity which nature has
placed among different objects.
Now it appears evident that, if this
conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one
instance, as after ever so long a course of experience.
But the case is
far otherwise.
It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in
any category, that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a
particular event.
A long
course of uniform experiments shows us a number of uniform effects,
resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects,
at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces.
When
a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect
similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect.
All inferences from experience suppose, as
their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar
powers will be connected with similar sensible qualities.
If there be any suspicion that the course of
nature may change, and that
the past may be no rule in the
future, all experience becomes
useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.
All inferences from experience
are effects of expectations, not of reasoning.
Expectation, then, is
the great guide of human life.
It is that principle
alone which renders our experience useful to us, and
makes us expect, in the
future, a similar course of events with those which have appeared in the
past.
Without
the influence of
expectation, we should be
entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately in the
present.
We should never know how to
adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any
effect.
There would be an end at once of all action.
It may
be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us
beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of
matters of fact which happened
in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some facts must always be
present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing
these conclusions.
A man, who should find in a desert country the
remains of pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient
times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature
occur to him, he could never form such
an inference.
We learn the events of former ages from history; but
then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained, and
thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at
the eyewitness' and
spectators of these distant events.
In a
word, if we proceed not upon some fact present to the memory or senses, our
reasoning would be merely hypothetical; and however
the particular links might be
connected with each other, the
whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we
ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence.
If I
ask why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must
tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other matter of fact,
connected with it.
As you cannot proceed after this manner, in
infinitum, you must at last terminate in some matter of fact, which is
present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely
without foundation.
What is the conclusion of the whole matter?
A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the
common theories of philosophy.
All
belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object,
present to the memory or senses, and a perceived connection between that and
some other object.
In other words; having found, in many instances,
that any two kinds of object - flame and heat, snow and cold - have always been
connected together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind
is carried by expectation to expect
heat or cold, and to believe
that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer
approach.
This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in
such circumstances.
It is
an operation of the soul,
when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the
passion of compassion, when we receive benefits; or
hatred, when we meet with
injuries.
All these operations are of
natural instincts, which
no reasoning or
process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to
prevent.
The great advantage of the
mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the
former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate,
the smallest distinction
between them is immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still
expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity or variation.
An oval
is never mistaken for a
circle, nor an hyperbola for an
ellipse.
The isosceles and right triangles are distinguished by
boundaries more exact than vice and
virtue, right and wrong.
If any term be defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itself,
substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for the term defined: or even
when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the
senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly
apperceived.
The
finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the understanding, the various
agitations of the passion, though
really in themselves distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by
reflection; nor is it in our
power to recall the original object, as
often as we have occasion to
contemplate
it.
Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our
reasoning: similar objects are readily taken to be the same: and the conclusion
becomes at last very wide of the premises.
If the mind, with greater
facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on
a much longer and more intricate chain
of reasoning and compare ideas much wider of each other in order to reach
the abstruse truths of moral science.
If moral ideas are apt, the
inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate
steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which
treat of quantity and number.
In reality, there is scarcely a
proposition in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of more parts, than are to
be found in any moral reasoning
which runs not into chimera and conceit.
Where we
trace the principles of the human mind
through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress;
considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries, and
reduces us to an
acknowledgment of ignorance.
The chief obstacle, therefore, to
our improvement in the moral or
metaphysical sciences
is the obscurity of ideas, and
ambiguity of terms.
The
principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and
compass of thought, requisite to the
forming of any conclusion.
Perhaps, our progress in physics is chiefly
retarded by the want of proper experiments and phenomena, which are often
discovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by
the most diligent and
prudent inquiry.
As moral philosophy appears hitherto to have
received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude,
that, if there be any difference in this regard among these sciences, the
difficulties, which obstruct the progress of the former, require superior care
and capacity to be surmounted.
All our ideas are nothing but copies of our
impressions, or, in other words, that
it is impossible for us to think of
anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or
internal senses.
Complex ideas, may, perhaps, be well known by
definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas,
that compose them.
When we have pushed up definitions to the most
simple ideas, and find still more ambiguity and obscurity; what
resource are we then possessed of?
By what
invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether
precise and determinate to our intellectual view?
Produce the impressions or original
sentiments from which ideas are copied.
These impressions are all strong and
sensible.
They admit not of ambiguity.
They are not only
placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent
ideas, which dwell in obscurity.
The scenes of the universe are
continually shifting, and one object follows another in uninterrupted
succession; but the power
which actuates the whole is concealed from us.
It might reasonably
be expected in questions which have been
canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science,
and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been
agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two
thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of
the controversy.
How easy may it appear to give exact definitions of
the terms employed in reasoning,
and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future
scrutiny and examination.
If we consider the matter more narrowly, we
shall be apt to draw a quite opposite
conclusion.
From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been
long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is
some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas
to the words employed in the controversy.
As
the faculties of the mind are naturally alike
in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to
reason or dispute together; it were
impossible, if men
affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different
opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and
each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give
them the victory over their antagonists.
It is true, if men attempt the
discussion of questions which are entirely beyond the reach of human capacity,
such as those concerning the origin of substance, or the economy of the
intellectual system, they may long beat the air
in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate
conclusion.
If the question
regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think,
could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions,
which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling
with each other.
All mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always
been of the same opinion with regard to this subject.
A few
intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole
controversy.
I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all
hands, and has led philosophers into such a
labyrinth of obscure sophistry,
that it is no wonder, if a
sensible reader indulge his ease
so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a
question, from which he can expect
neither instruction or
entertainment.
The state of the
argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his attention; as it has
more novelty, promises at least some
decision of the controversy,
and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning.
I hope, therefore, to make it
appear that all men have ever agreed in theory both of connection and of
liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms;
and that the whole controversy, has hitherto turned merely upon words.
We shall begin with examining theory of connection.
It appears
evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a
manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object
was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we
should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of connection among
these objects.
Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of
nature would, from that moment would be at an end; and the memory and
senses would remain the only canals by which
the knowledge of any realexistence
could possibly have access to the mind.
Our idea, therefore, of
connection arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the
operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly connected together,
and the mind is determined by expectation to infer the one from the appearance
of the other.
Beyond the constant connection of similar objects, and
the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any
connection.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever
allowed, with out any doubt or
hesitation, that these connections take place in the voluntary actions of men,
and in the operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever
agreed in theory of connection, and they have hitherto disputed merely for not
understanding each other.
It is universally acknowledged that there is
a great uniformity among the
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still
the same, in its principles and
operations.
The same
motives always produce the
same actions: the same events follow from the
same causes.
Ambition,
avarice,
narcissism,
vanity,
friendship, generosity,
public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed
through society, have been, from the
beginning, and still are, the source of all the actions and
enterprises, which have ever been
observed among mankind.
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and
course of life of the Greeks
and Romans?
Study well the
temper and actions of the French and English:
You cannot be much
mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have
made with regard to the latter.
Mankind are so much the same, in all
times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this
particular.
Its chief use is only to discover
the constant and universal principles of
human nature, by showing men in
all varieties of circumstances and situations, and
furnishing us with materials from which we
may form our observations and become
acquainted with the regular springs of
human action and behavior.
Records of wars, intrigues,
factions, and
revolutions, are so many
collections of
experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the
principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or
physicist becomes
acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by
experiments which he forms
concerning them.
Should a traveler, returning from a far
country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we
were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of
avarice, ambition, or
revenge; who knew no pleasure but
friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these
circumstances, detect the falsehood, and
prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration
with stories of centaurs and dragons,
miracles and prodigies.
To explode any forgery in history,
we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the
actions ascribed to any individual are directly contrary to the
course of nature, and
that human motives, in such circumstances, induced the
storyteller to
inaccurately report matters of
fact.
We must not, however, expect that this
uniformity of human actions
should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances,
will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for
the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions.
Such a uniformity in every particular,
is found in no part of nature.
Hence likewise the benefit of that
experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in
order to instruct us in the principles
of human nature informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular.
Its chief use is only to discover
the constant and universal
principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of
circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we
may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of
human action and behavior.
Why is the aged gardener more skillful
in his calling than the young beginner?
Because there is a certain
uniformity in the operation of the
sun, rain, and
Earth towards
the production of
vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which
this operation is governed and directed.
From observing the variety of
conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims,
which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.
Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries?
We learn thence the great force of expectation and education, which
mold the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established
character.
Are the actions of the same individual much diversified in
the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age?
This
affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our
sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail
in the different ages of human
life.
Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual,
have a uniformity in their
influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the individuals and our observation
of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct
our behavior with regard to them.
The mutual dependence of men is so
great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in
itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which
are requisite to make it answer
fully the intention of the agent acting.
The poorest
craftsman, who labors alone, expects
at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him the enjoyment of
the fruits of his labor.
He also expects that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers
them at a reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the
money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which
are requisite for his subsistence.
In proportion as men extend their
dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they
always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater
variety of voluntary actions, which they
expect, from the proper motives, to coöperate with their own.
In
all these conclusions they take their measures from past
experience, in the same manner
as in their reasoning concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men,
as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same
that they have ever found them.
In short, this experimental inference
and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life
that no man, while awake, is
ever a moment without employing it.
When we consider how aptly natural
and moral evidence link together, and form only
one chain of argument, we
shall allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same
principles.
To proceed in reconciling this project with regard to the
question of liberty and connection;
the most contentious
question of metaphysics, the
most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove mankind
has ever agreed in theory on liberty as well as in that of connection, and that
the whole dispute, in this regard also, has been hitherto merely verbal.
Whatever definition we may give to liberty, we should be careful to
observe two requisite circumstances;
First, that it be consistent with
plain matter of fact;
Secondly, that it be consistent with itself.
If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition
intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be
found of one opinion with regard to it.
Liberty is the ability to act or
not act.
When any opinion leads to
absurdities, it is certainly
false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it seems of
dangerous consequence.
I affirm that the doctrines, both of connection and of liberty are not
only consistent with morality,
but are absolutely essential to its support.
The mind of man, formed by
nature, displaying certain characteristics and having dispositions immediately
feels the sentiment of approbation or
blame.
These distinctions are found in the
natural sentiments of the human mind and will not be altered by any
philosophical theory or speculation.
The origin of
the passions of man will acquire authority if we find the same theory is
requisite in explaining the same phenomena in all other animals.
Animals as well as men learn many things from experience.
Both
infer the same events will always follow from the same causes.
By this principle they become acquainted
with the properties of matter.
From their birth a treasurehouse of
knowledge of the nature of fire,
water, earth and of the effects which result from
their conjunction.
The ignorance of youth contrasts
the plainly distinguishable sagacity of the aged, who after long observation,
avoid pain while in pursuit of pleasure.
A horse, accustomed to the
field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will
never attempt what exceeds his force and ability.
The creature infers some matter of
fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses and that this inference is
altogether founded on past experience.
He expects from the present
situation the same consequences
which it has always found in observation to result from similar objects and
conditions.
Though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from
observation, there are also many parts which they derive from the original hand
of nature; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest
practice and experience.
These are denominate instincts, to be admired as something
extraordinary, and inexplicable by the
disquisitions of human understanding.
Our
wonder will cease or diminish when we
consider that the experimental reasoning which we possess in common with
beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life, depends, is nothing but
instinct; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or
comparisons of ideas, as are
the proper objects of our
intellectual faculties.
Though the instinct be different, yet still
it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that,
which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the incubation, and the whole
economy and order of its nursery.
I have frequently considered
why mankind, though they without hesitation, acknowledged the
doctrine of connection and reasoning, have
yet had such a reluctance to acknowledged it in words, and have rather shown a
propensity, in all ages, to profess the contrary opinion of
separation.
Uncertainty proceeds from the
secret opposition of contrary causes.
There is no method of
reasoning more common, and yet none more false in philosophical disputes, to
endeavor the refutation
of any hypothesis, by a pretense
of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality.
The general
observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human
nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts and appearances no longer
deceive us.
A
man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes that an argument that has
escaped his own investigation does not really exist.
Nothing
appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a
philosophical eye, than the ease with which the many are governed by a
few.
David Hume |
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This web site is not a commercial web site and
is presented for educational purposes only.
This website defines a
new perspective with which to engage reality to which its author adheres. The
author feels that the falsification of reality outside personal experience has
forged a populace unable to discern propaganda from reality and that this has
been done purposefully by an international corporate cartel through their
agents who wish to foist a corrupt version of reality on the human race.
Religious intolerance occurs when any group refuses to tolerate religious
practices, religious beliefs or persons due to their religious ideology. This
web site marks the founding of a system of philosophy named The Truth of the
Way of the Lumière Infinie - a rational gnostic mystery religion based
on reason which requires no leap of faith, accepts no tithes, has no supreme
leader, no church buildings and in which each and every individual is
encouraged to develop a personal relation with the Creator and Sustainer
through the pursuit of the knowledge of reality in the hope of curing the
spiritual corruption that has enveloped the human spirit. The tenets of The
Truth of the Way of the Lumière Infinie are spelled out in detail on
this web site by the author. Violent acts against individuals due to their
religious beliefs in America is considered a "hate crime."
This web site
in no way condones violence. To the contrary the intent here is to reduce the
violence that is already occurring due to the international corporate cartels
desire to control the human race. The international corporate cartel already
controls the world economic system, corporate media worldwide, the global
industrial military entertainment complex and is responsible for the collapse
of morals, the elevation of self-centered behavior and the destruction of
global ecosystems. Civilization is based on coöperation. Coöperation
does not occur at the point of a gun.
American social mores and values
have declined precipitously over the last century as the corrupt international
cartel has garnered more and more power. This power rests in the ability to
deceive the populace in general through corporate media by pressing emotional
buttons which have been preprogrammed into the population through prior
corporate media psychological operations. The results have been the destruction
of the family and the destruction of social structures that do not adhere to
the corrupt international elites vision of a perfect world. Through distraction
and coercion the direction of thought of the bulk of the population has been
directed toward solutions proposed by the corrupt international elite that
further consolidates their power and which further their purposes.
All
views and opinions presented on this web site are the views and opinions of
individual human men and women that, through their writings, showed the
capacity for intelligent, reasonable, rational, insightful and unpopular
thought. All factual information presented on this web site is believed to be
true and accurate and is presented as originally presented in print media which
may or may not have originally presented the facts truthfully. Opinion and
thoughts have been adapted, edited, corrected, redacted, combined, added to,
re-edited and re-corrected as nearly all opinion and thought has been
throughout time but has been done so in the spirit of the original writer with
the intent of making his or her thoughts and opinions clearer and relevant to
the reader in the present time.
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 Copyright
© Lawrence Turner
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